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I. Introduction 
 
The Meskhetian Turks is a population, which was deported to Central Asia, along 
with seven other ethnic groups in the Soviet Union during World War II. Whilst 
other deported people, Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Karachais and Kalmyks were 
rehabilitated after Stalin’s death and allowed to resettle in their pre-deportation 
territories, three groups were not permitted to return. These included the Crimean 
Tatars, who were only to be rehabilitated with the demise of the Soviet Union, 
and have subsequently returned in significant numbers to Crimea in Ukraine over 
the past 15 years. Another group, the Volga Germans, originally deported from 
the Soviet Volga German Republic, have largely emigrated to Germany in the 
post Soviet Era, and do not have territorial aspirations in the Volga region. Hence, 
the Meskhetian Turks are the last of the 8 deported peoples, for whom 
rehabilitation and resettlement remains unresolved.  
 
As the last of Stalin’s deported people, the Meskhetian Turks today live dispersed 
throughout several countries: Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. Meskhetian Turks face very 
different living conditions in their countries of settlement, ranging from 
statelessness and discrimination in southern Russia, to higher levels of socio-
economic integration, e.g. in Ukraine, Azerbaijan or in Central Asia. The 
Meskhetian Turks were originally deported from Georgia, which has since 
become an independent state, but opposes repatriation of Meskhetian Turks and 
has effectively blocked efforts to implement the repatriation plans pledged by 
Meskhetian Turk’s organizations and the international community. 
 
Relatively little is known about the current situation of the Meskhetian Turks. 
This working paper attempts to give an overview of the main aspects of the 
‘Meskhetian Turkish question’, including their history, the population group’s 
current socio-economic situation, their organization and civic life, and the 
international dimension of the deportation and resettlement issue. The paper also 
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seeks to identify areas for further research that have not been explored in-depth, 
but which are crucial for future attempts to address the issue coherently in order to 
find durable solutions to the issue of return.  
 
This working paper also marks the launch a large-scale research project, 
“Between Integration and Resettlement: The Meskhetian Turks”, which has been 
made possible through generous support of the Volkswagen Stiftung, to be carried 
out by the European Centre for Minority Issues from July 2004 to February 2006. 
  
The project aims to produce a comprehensive and comparative cross-border study 
of today’s Meskhetian Turk communities, and strives to develop an alternative 
discourse to the framework maintained by international actors addressing the 
problems of the Meskhetian Turks, which is based on an a priori assumption that 
Meskhetian Turks desire to return to their region of origin. The project, through 
multi-disciplinary research in the eight above countries, seeks to grasp the 
complexity of the subject by obtaining a thorough understanding of Meskhetian 
Turkish identity, migration processes, concepts of ‘home’ and social organization, 
which can provide the basis for new approaches to find durable solutions to the 
problems of the Meskhetian Turks.  
  
The findings of the project are envisaged to form a scholarly basis for future 
national and international endeavors to find durable solutions to the long-lasting 
problems faced by this disadvantaged population group. The project will yield an 
authoritative research volume to be published in late 2006. 
 
This paper will briefly examine the history of the people and the events that have 
largely shaped the present fate of the population group in question. The first 
section will provide brief country-specific accounts of the conditions Meskhetian 
Turks are facing in their countries of residence. The second chapter gives an 
account of Meskhetian Turks’ organizations, including their diverse aspirations 
and arguments on identity. The third chapter discusses the international process 
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and the most prominent international attempts to address the issue, including a 
particular examination of the repatriation issue. The fourth chapter provides a 
brief review of the existing literature, and explores the deficiencies of data and 
material available on the subject at present. The final chapter opens a discussion 
of the discourses on the repatriation issue and identifies their shortfalls, while 
identifying new approaches for the research to be conducted under the ECMI 
research project on Meskhetian Turks. 
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1. Who Are the Meskhetian Turks? 
 
The origin of the Meskhetian Turks is a widely disputed and contested issue. 
There is little agreement as to whether the Meskhetian Turks are in fact ethnic 
Turks, or rather ethnic Georgians who at some stage in history adopted or were 
converted to Islam. In historical documents, Meskhetian Turks have variously 
been labeled as ‘Turks’, ‘Georgian-Sunnis’ and ‘Tatars’ amongst other names. 
After the deportation of 1944, the terminology used by the locals in Central Asia 
referred mostly to their original place of settlement in the Caucasus, such as 
‘Georgians’ and ‘Azerbaijanis’, whilst the official Soviet documents primarily 
designated them  ‘Turks’, ‘Caucasians’ or even ‘Uzbeks’. In Turkey the term 
‘Ahiska Turkleri’ is widely used with reference to Akhaltsikhe, the largest city in 
their native region.1 
 
In Georgia, Soviet and post-Soviet historiography mostly follows the view that 
Meskhetian Turks are descendants of the ancient Georgian tribe of ‘Meskhet’. 
The argument goes that strong Turkish cultural influences from the sixteenth 
through nineteenth century and processes of Islamic conversion separated the 
Meskhetian Turks from the Christian Georgians.2 The counter-argument holds 
that the ancestors of Meskhetian Turks were people from Turkic tribes that settled 
                                                
1 Yunusov Arif, “Meskhetian Turks: Twice Deported People”, Institute of Peace and Democracy, 
Baku, Azerbaijan,2000, at http://kavkaz.memo.ru/bookstext/books/id/409931.html. According to 
some sources, the local Muslims of Samtskhe-Javakheti prior to the Soviet Era referred to 
themselves as ‘Gurcu oglu’, i.e. son of Georgians, ‘Gurcu donme’, i.e.Georgian convert, ‘Yerli’, 
i.e. local, or ‘Ahiska Turks’. Nana Sumbadze, “Muslim Population of Southern Georgia: 
Challenges to Repatriation” in Gia Nodia (ed.) “Ethnic-Confessional Groups and Challenges to 
Civic Integration in Georgia”, Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development - 
CIPDD (Tbilisi, Georgia 2002), 43-44; Binali Aliev, “Meskhetia and the Meskhi (Meskhetian 
Turks): Their Ethnic and Political Past”, 1 Central Asia and the Caucasus Journal of Social and 
Political Studies (2002)  13 ,156. 
2 Svetlana Chervonnaya, “The Problem of the Repatriation of the Meskhet-Turks, Appendix to the 
fact-finding mission of the FUEN delegation to Georgia, November 1998” (ed. FUEN - Federal 
Union of European Nationalities), 1-2 at 
http://www.arts.uwaterloo.ca/MINELRES/min/meskh/FUEN_Meskh.htm. 
??Sumbadze, “Muslim Population…”, 43-44. 
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in the region between the fifth and seventh century.3 It has been suggested that 
during the eleventh through twelfth and especially from the sixteenth through 
eighteenth century, when the present-day Georgian lands were under Ottoman 
rule, the local Turkish tribes were effectively consolidated, thereby creating a new 
ethnicity: the Meskhetian Turks.4 
 
The vernacular spoken by the mostly Sunni Muslim Meskhetian Turks is an East 
Anatolian dialect of Turkish.5 Their language, in comparison with the Turkic 
languages spoken in Central Asia, is very close to Turkish spoken in neighboring 
Turkey, although it has adopted some new elements due to the changing socio-
linguistic circumstances of the population. Culturally, Meskhetian Turks are 
closely related to Anatolian Turks, with many ‘Caucasian’ features adopted from 
the Georgians. In addition to their native language, most Meskhetian Turks spoke 
Georgian before the 1944 deportation.6 
 
However important the origin of the Meskhetian Turks may be, the issue of 
terminology is both politically and emotionally highly charged and is not explored 
here in length. The term Meskhetian Turk(s) applied in this paper is not a 
statement indicating sympathies towards any of the opposing orientations, and the 
term is adopted exclusively for convenience purposes. The term refers to the 
people deported from southwest Georgia, today the region known as Samtskhe-
Javakheti, in November 1944. The adoption of this term is made with reference to 
the 1998 ‘Hague Meeting on issues relating to Meskhetian Turks’, during which 
all participants for the sake of clarity accepted that the term  be used in the 
meeting’s final document. 7 By applying the term, this paper does not maintain 
                                                
3 Chervonnaya, “The Problem of the Repatriation…”. 
4 Yunusov, “Meskhetian Turks…” at http://kavkaz.memo.ru/bookstext/books/id/409937.html. 
5 Memorial Human Rights Centre, “The Situation of the Turks-Meskhetians – The Violation of the 
Rights of Forced Migrants and Ethnic Discrimination in Krasnodar Territory” at 
http://www.memo.ru/hr/discrim/meshi/ENG/chapter4.htm. 
6 Chervonnaya, “The Problem of the Repatriation…” at 
http://www.arts.uwaterloo.ca/MINELRES/min/meskh/FUEN_Meskh.htm.  
7 “Document of The Hague Meeting on the issues relating to the Meskhetian Turks 7-10 
September 1998”, in “Meskhetian Turks: Solutions and Human Security, Appendix One” Forced 
Migration Projects of the Open Society Institute – FMP OSI, 1998, New York , 66. A significant 
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that the population group in question is necessarily homogeneous,  with uniform 
ethnonational aspirations or identity, or that the people under discussion even 
formed a cohesive group in 1944, as it is widely assumed among political actors 
today. 
 
2. A History of Forced Migration 
 
The Stalin Regime’s deportation of the Meskhetian Turks, which took place on 15 
to 17 November 1944, resulted in the exile of the entire population group, an 
estimated 90,000-120,000 people. They were resettled mostly in Central Asia, 
particularly Uzbekistan. Many deportees died en route or as an indirect 
consequence of the resettlement.8 There is no consensus on the reasons for the 
deportation.9 Unlike other deported people, who were rehabilitated in the 1950s 
and 1960s (or the Crimean Tatars who have been allowed to return since the late 
1980s), the Meskhetian Turks have neither been rehabilitated, allowed to return to 
their land of origin, nor had their property returned. In 1956, a few years after 
Stalin’s death, the restrictions on Meskhetian Turks’ movement were lifted. In the 
                                                                                                                                
part of the meeting was spent arguing terminological issues, as was also the case at the follow-up 
meeting in Vienna 1999. At the 1998 meeting, the participants finally agreed to use the term 
“Meskhetian Turks” in the end document, as long as all the participants’ views were recorded. 
8 The official number of deportees from Georgia (dated in 1948) was 95,542 of which most were 
Meskhetian Turks; 15,432 died en route or in exile. Also Kurds (est. 3000) living in the same 
region as well as Khemsins (est. 1000; Armenians whose ancestors converted to Islam) and 
Terekeme (a Turkic pastoral nomadic tribe that arrived to the region from eastern Caucasus in the 
late 19th Century) were deported. It is worth noting that some people of Azeri and Laz nationality 
(also Muslim) living in the region were likewise deported. However, after the authorities realised 
the mistake they were allowed to return (Yunusov “Meskhetian Turks…”, at 
http://kavkaz.memo.ru/bookstext/books/id/409932.html#i7), whereas Meskhetian Turks, Khemsils 
and Terekeme were not. Extremely little is known about the deported Kurdish, Khemsil and 
Terekeme populations. However, it is known that in some localities they live together with 
Meskhetian Turks. Some sources consider the official data regarding the deportation to be 
depleted (see e.g. Chervonnaya, “The Problem of Repatriation…”; IOM, “Deported Peoples of the 
Former Soviet Union: the Case of the Meskhetians”, (Geneva, Switzerland 1998), 5. 
9 The most commonly held view among historians is that the Meskhetian Turks were seen as 
potential subversive elements in the region, especially when taking into consideration the 
proximity of the Turkish border. The official Soviet justification followed the pretexts of the 
deportation of Chechens, Ingush, Tatars and other peoples, namely alleged “co-operation” with the 
advancing German Army, although at the closest, the German Army was a hundred miles away 
from Meskhetia. Some scholars have also argued that Meskhetian Turks would have been a 
seditious factor in Stalin’s alleged plans of invading Turkey; see FMP OSI, “Meskhetian 
Turks…”, 5. 
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new era of the Cold War, however, the native lands of the Meskhetian Turks 
adjacent to the border-zone between the Soviet Union and NATO had become 
geo-politically important, thus hampering efforts towards repatriation. The deep 
suspicion of the local Soviet Georgian authorities towards repatriation also 
translated into a range of technical obstacles. Small numbers of Meskhetian Turks 
migrated from Central Asia to other Union republics from 1956 onwards, but the 
vast majority remained in Central Asia until 1989.10 
 
The winds of Gorbachev’s liberal policies of glasnost’ and perestroika brought 
further suffering to the Meskhetian Turks. The repatriation of Crimean Tatars to 
Crimea, which started en masse after 1988 and resulted in the repatriation of an 
estimated 250,000 Crimean Tatars, is by no means comparable to the situation of 
the Meskhetian Turks. In June 1989, a pogrom broke out against the Meskhetian 
Turks in the Uzbek section of the Ferghana Valley, and resulted in the deaths of 
dozens of Meskhetian Turks.11 The underlying causes for the pogrom are still 
ambiguous. After intervention by the Soviet Army, the situation was somehow 
stabilized. However, as a result 17,000 Meskhetian Turks were immediately 
evacuated by Soviet Army troops, and the events led to a larger outflow of 
Meskhetian Turks from Uzbekistan. It is estimated that over 60,000 Meskhetian 
Turks left the republic after the initial evacuation. Thus a large segment of 
Uzbekistan’s Meskhetian Turks faced a second involuntary resettlement 45 years 
after Stalin’s deportation. The bulk of the displaced Meskhetian Turks settled in 
Azerbaijan, while many found their ways to different parts of Russia, especially to 
                                                
10 The migration was mainly directed to Russia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. In 1974, the Central 
authorities lifted the restrictions on movement of Meskhetian Turks to their homeland through a 
special decree. In practice, both Moscow and Tbilisi prevented this from happening; see Yunusov 
“Meskhetian Turks…”, at http://kavkaz.memo.ru/bookstext/books/id/409932.html#i7. 
11 112 were killed, 1032 were wounded and hundreds of domiciles were destroyed; Sumbadze, 
“Muslim Population…”, 45. Of the casualties about half were identified as Meskhetian Turks 
(Personal correspondence with Alexander Osipov in 29.8.2003). The reasons for the pogrom are 
disputed. Some argue that it was the liberal political tendencies that unleashed Uzbek nationalism, 
the poor conditions in the over-populated Ferghana Valley that lead to ethnic violence; see FMP 
OSI, “Meskhetian Turks…”, 6; or just a series of contingent factors that gathered a critical mass 
resulting in an unplanned outbreak of violence (Personal correspondence with Osipov in 
29.8.2003), while others argue that they were orchestrated by the Soviet authorities; see Yunusov, 
“Meskhetian Turks…”, at http://kavkaz.memo.ru/bookstext/books/id/409932.html#i9. 
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various regions in central and southern Russia, and to Ukraine, while yet others 
settled in the republics adjacent to Uzbekistan: Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.12 
 
 
II. The Meskhetian Turks’ Current Demographic and Socio-Political 
Situation 
 
Due to a lack of reliable census data on Meskhetian Turks in the former Soviet 
Republics, and because of inconsistent practices for counting Meskhetian Turks, 
statistics as to their numbers vary greatly. Most experts estimate the number of 
Meskhetian Turks currently living in the former Soviet Union at 270-345,000. It 
is estimated that 90-110,000 live in Azerbaijan, 90-100,000 in Kazakhstan, 50-
70,000 in Russia, 25-30,000 in Kyrgyzstan, 10-15,000 in Uzbekistan and 5-
10,000 in Ukraine.13 The Meskhetian Turks living in Russia and Ukraine are 
mostly migrants and evacuees from the Ferghana Valley. Moreover, it is 
estimated that over 25,000 Meskhetian Turks reside in Turkey, including those 
who resettled in the country officially or illegally before and after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. 12,000 Meskhetian Turks who arrived in Turkey prior to 1997 
received status as “national refugees”, securing them access to education, work 
and healthcare, as well as future prospects for Turkish citizenship.14  
 
The present living conditions of the Meskhetian Turks vary significantly 
according to their place of settlement. The problems are most acute in the Russian 
section of the Caucasus, especially in Krasnodar Krai, where the local Meskhetian 
                                                
12  74,000 left Uzbekistan; 40,000 went to Azerbaijan; 17,500 went to Kazakhstan; 16,000 went to 
Russia. Yunusov, in support of his conspiracy view on the riots, writes that by 1989 Uzbekistan 
had become the centre of Meskhetian Turks’ (political) activities, as at the time 106,000 (or 51% 
of all) Meskhetian Turks lived in that republic. Yunusov “Meskhetian Turks…”, at 
 http://kavkaz.memo.ru/bookstext/books/id/409932.html#i9. 
13 Yunusov, “Meskhetian Turks…”, at 
http://kavkaz.memo.ru/bookstext/books/id/409933.html#i11; Sumbadze, “Muslim Population…”, 
47-49. 
14 Sumbadze, “Muslim Population…”, 48; According to another source, Turkey has overall 
sponsored the resettlement of 5,000 Meskhetian Turks to Turkey since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union; Anna Matveeva, “The South Caucasus – Nationalism, Conflict and Minorities”, Minority 
Rights Group International Reports (London, 2002), 21. 
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Turks face discrimination and a range of bureaucratic obstacles for normal 
livelihood imposed by the local authorities. Xenophobic regional policies and 
difficult relations with the local Cossack population have left Meskhetian Turks 
anxious about their future. Although there are other national minorities in the 
region, Meskhetian Turks are the primary target for ethnic discrimination. Having 
been denied refugee status on the one hand, and not being able to gain Russian 
citizenship or propiska (residence permit) on the other, many Meskhetian Turks 
are left without official status to secure their basic human rights in Krasnodar 
Krai. This policy makes many Meskhetian Turks de-facto stateless in the Krai. 
The lack of propiska prevents many Meskhetian Turks from working, possessing 
property or even from registering their marriages officially. Moreover, campaigns 
of forced expulsion of Meskhetian Turks from the region as well as physical 
attacks have taken place repeatedly in Krasnodar Krai. Nightly Cossack raids on 
Meskhetian Turks’ homes are also common.15  
 
The Meskhetian Turks living in other parts of Russia, notably Belgorod Oblast’, 
Rostov Oblast’, Stavropol Krai and Volgograd Oblast’ also encounter various 
degrees of official harassment and antipathy from local populations, but their 
general conditions are unquestionably better compared those in Krasnodar Krai. 
In most regions of the Russian Federation, in contrast to Krasnodar Krai, the 
                                                
15 Of the estimated 16-18,000 Meskhetian Turks (0.3% of the districts total population) living in 
Krasnodar Krai, an estimated 10-12,000 have been denied permanent residence registration 
leading to refusal of most social, political and legal rights; Alexander Osipov, “The Situation and 
Legal Status of Meskhetians in Russian Federation”, Memorial Human Rights Centre (Moscow 
2003), 4-5, 8; see also Memorial “O Soblyudenii Rossiiskoi Federatsiyei Mezhdunarodnoi 
Konventsii o Likvidatsiya Vsekh form Rasovoi Diskriminatsii – Pryamaya Diskriminatsiya 
Meskhetinskikh Turok v Krasnodarskom Kraye”, (Moscow 2002), at  
http://www.memo.ru/hr/discrim/ethnic/docl_ind.htm. 
The most detailed and insightful reports of the Meskhetian Turks’ situation in Southern Russia 
are:  Sergei Ryazantsev, “Ethnic Migration and Condition of the Meskhetian Turks at the South of 
Russia”, an unpublished report prepared for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
and the Danish Refugee Council, (Stavropol, 2000); Alexander Osipov, “Narushenie Prav 
Vinuzhdennikh Migrantov I Etnicheskaya Diskriminatsiya v Krasnodarskom Kraye – Polozhenie 
Meskhetinskikh Turkov”, Memorial (Moscow Part 1 in 1996, Part 2 in 1999) at 
http://www.memo.ru/hr/discrim/meshi/index.htm. For legal aspects of the issue in Southern Russia 
see Alexander Osipov, “The Situation and Legal Status of Meskhetians in Russian Federation”, 
Memorial Human Rights Centre (Moscow 2003). See also Anton Popov, ”Ethnic Minorities and 
Migration Processes in Krasnodar Territory”, 1 Central Asia and the Caucasus Journal of Social 
and Political Studies (2002) ,13, 
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majority of Meskhetian Turks have received Russian citizenship under the 1991 
Law on Citizenship.16 
The conditions for Meskhetian Turks living in other former Soviet republics are 
also beyond doubt better than those in southern Russia. Due to linguistic and 
cultural ties and an absence of discrimination from the local authorities, the 
Meskhetian Turks living in Azerbaijan face few of the problems prevalent in the 
North across the Caucasus mountain range. In the Central Asian republics of 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the socio-political conditions for the Meskhetian 
Turks also seem relatively unproblematic. The situation in Uzbekistan is stable for 
the time being, but the 1989 pogrom has left the local Meskhetian Turk 
community wary of a possible recurrence.17 In general, the problems encountered 
by the Meskhetian Turks in Central Asia and Azerbaijan are similar to those 
facing the population as a whole, and are mainly economic. 
 
1. Georgia 
  
A USSR Supreme Soviet’s decree 135/142 issued in 1956 eased some of the 
previously imposed restrictions on the formerly deported peoples. As mentioned, 
the Meskhetian Turks were not rehabilitated, but in the years that followed some 
Meskhetian Turks were allowed to resettle in Azerbaijan. In 1974, all the 
officially authorized acts restricting Meskhetian Turks’ return were overturned, 
but in practice the Soviet propiska system, southwest Georgia’s special status as a 
border-region and perhaps most importantly the Georgian authorities’ 
unwillingness to receive Meskhetian Turk repatriates, effectively blocked efforts 
for return to southwest Georgia and Georgia as a whole. From 1974 until the late 
1980s, many Georgian dissidents and intellectuals petitioned intensely for 
Meskhetian Turks’ repatriation. As a result, several hundred Meskhetian Turkish 
families eventually returned to various regions of Georgia (though not to their 
historic homeland of southwest Georgia) prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
                                                
16 Alexander Osipov, “The Situation and Legal Status of Meskhetians in Russian Federation”, 
Memorial Human Rights Centre, (Moscow, 2003), 8. 
17 FMP OSI, “Meskhetian Turks…”, 8-16. 
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Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Georgia’s first post-Soviet president, initially supported the 
return of the formerly deported people, but changed his position as communist 
rule came to an end. After attaining power, Gamsakhurdia’s jingoistic policies 
caused the forced expulsion of many Meskhetian Turk returnees, while many 
others decided to leave voluntarily.18 Although his successor, Eduard 
Shevardnadze, changed Georgia’s official position vis-à-vis repatriation, very 
little practical progress has been made beyond the pledges of the international 
community to solve the issue.19 
 
The official number of repatriates by the end of 2001 was 644 persons. However, 
according to UNHCR, the UN refugee agency, no new Meskhetian Turks have 
settled in Georgia since the end of 2000.20 No one knows the numbers of those 
who have arrived in Georgia illegally – they are a group with poor prospects for 
obtaining residence documents and civil rights. According to some estimates there 
are an estimated total of 1,000 Meskhetian Turks in Georgia.21 A range of 
preconditions set by the Georgian authorities has hampered the process of 
repatriation and dispirited most potential resettlers. Of the mentioned 644 
Meskhetian Turks who have officially returned after the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union and decided to stay so far, 32 remained without legal status in 
2001.22 
                                                
18 Sumbadze, “Muslim Population…”, 46. 
19 Yunusov, “Meskhetian Turks...”, at 
http://kavkaz.memo.ru/bookstext/books/id/409933.html#i15. 
20 UNHCR Global Report 2001 – Georgia, 383, 384; UNHCR Global Report 2002 - Georgia; 
telephone interview with UNHCR/Protection Unit, Tbilisi, Georgia, 30.7.2003. 
21 Nino Gertsmava, “Meskhetians Make a New Life in Georgia”, Institute for War & Peace 
Reporting Caucasus Reporting Service CRS No. 199 at 
http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/cau/cau_200310_199_5_eng.txt. 
22 UNHCR Global Report 2001 – Georgia, 383; Citizenship was granted only after combined 
pressure from UNHCR and OSCE to the Georgian government (Matveeva, “The South 
Caucasus…”, 21). According to a report by the Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and 
Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe in Sep 2001 the number of returnees to 
Georgia was 655 of which 570 had become citizens of Georgia, at 
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=http%3A%2F%2Fassembly.coe.int 
%2Fdocuments%2Fworkingdocs%2Fdoc01%2Fedoc9191.htm. According to Marat Baratashvili, 
the chairman of the Georgian Repatriates Union, a single largest Meskhetian Turkish organization 
in Georgia, the population group’s overall number in the republic is around 700, of which 21 
remain stateless (interview with Marat Baratashvili in Tbilisi, Georgia 11.11.2003). 
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Indeed, some of the repatriates have left again due to technical obstacles imposed 
by the local authorities, including prolonged bureaucratic procedures to obtain 
residence/work permits and citizenship, and prerequisites to obtain Georgian 
surnames. The main areas of the Meskhetian Turkish resettlement are the regions 
of Imereti, Guria and the capital Tbilisi. Only about eight families are known to 
have resettled in the native territories of Samtskhe-Javakheti.23 The lack of 
integration programs and language tuition has made it increasingly difficult for 
Meskhetian Turks to integrate into society. The lack of Georgian language skills 
caused problems among the repatriate community with respect to their integration 
into Georgian society. Many of these obstacles are seen as deliberate attempts by 
the authorities to prevent a larger repatriation. Georgian public opinion is 
predominantly against Meskhetian Turks’ resettlement to Georgia and popular 
prejudices seem, to a large extent, to guide the course of debate over the 
repatriation issue. This is especially the case in Samtskhe-Javakheti, making the 
promotion of resettlement a daunting task for any politician in the country. 
 
Presently, the obstacles and opposition to repatriation of Meskhetian Turks in 
Georgia and Samtskhe-Javakheti can be described as two-fold: firstly, the 
Georgian government has shown great reluctance to agree on the principles for 
repatriation of Meskhetian Turks in the Republic and has introduced a range of 
technical obstacles to impede the process. Secondly, popular attitudes in Georgia 
at large, and especially among the largely ethnic Armenian populated region of 
Samtskhe-Javakheti (its clear already from the ‘Georgia at large’), seem to be 
unfavorably disposed towards any possible repatriation.24  
                                                
23 Indra Oeverland, “Defusing a Ticking Bomb? Disentangling International Organizations in 
Samtskhe-Javakheti”, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, NUPI Working paper No 646, 
at http://www.nupi.no/IPS/filestore/646.pdf.  
24 According to a survey conducted in Tbilisi in 1999, 46.4% of interviewed were against 
repatriation of Meskhetian Turks in Georgia, 44% supported only a return of deported population 
who consider themselves Georgians, while only 6.6% thought that all deportees had a right to 
return; Sumbadze, “Muslim Population…”, 55; According to another survey (conducted in Tbilisi 
and in the regions of Guria and Imreti), Georgians’ attitude towards Meskhetian Turks improved 
upon actually meeting some of them. The survey also concluded that national identity of returnees 
is an integral part of the debate over the repatriation (Nana Sumbadze & George Tarkhan-
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Samtskhe-Javakheti’s geopolitical location further perplexes the issue of 
repatriation. The borders with both Armenia and Turkey increase the region’s 
political and emotional charge among the local population, the political elite of 
the region, and the central government.25 The promotion of the unpopular issue of 
repatriation in the Republic’s domestic politics can gravely damage politicians’ 
future in the power structures. This is especially the case in Samtskhe-Javakheti, 
where politicians are expected to vigorously oppose any repatriation to the region. 
 
Most of the deported Meskhetian Turks were exiled from the western part of 
today’s Samtskhe-Javakheti region, i.e. Samtskhe. To repopulate the formerly 
Meskhetian Turk inhabited lands, an estimated 30,000 ethnic Georgians were 
forcefully resettled from the Zemo, Imreti and Racha regions of Georgia, thus 
changing the ethno-demographic composition of the region.26 
 
In contrast, ethnic Armenians predominantly populate Javakheti, from which only 
some 8,000 Meskhetian Turks were deported. The majority of those Meskhetian 
Turks who may wish to repatriate to their native land are anticipated to desire a 
move back to villages  in Samtskhe. However, it seems that Armenians and 
Georgians alike oppose repatriation to Samtskhe, and repatriation, without 
confidence-building measures, is likely to increase the already tense inter-ethnic 
relations in the region. Nevertheless, most current assumptions on Samtskhe-
Javakheti’s population’s attitudes are not based on scientific facts but popular 
                                                                                                                                
Mouravi, “Repatriation and Adaptation of Deported Meskhetians: Society and State in 
Supranational Context”, Centre for Geopolitical and Regional Studies (Tbilisi, Georgia 2001). The 
number of repatriates interviewed in Sumbadze & Tarkhan-Mouravi was 154 persons. At the time 
the number returnees was 644. The main concerns of the Georgian public regarding a possible 
repatriation are: “Turkisation” of Samtskhe-Javakheti, or secessionist tendencies, ethnic tension in 
the region (widely based on historical memory), comparisons with Georgia’s internally displaced 
persons (i.e. Why shouldn’t the problem of IDPs from South Ossetia and Abkhazia be solved 
first?), property issues and economic adversity in Georgia (for more in detail see Sumbadze, 
“Muslim Population…”, 56-58). 
25 See Sumbadze, “Muslim Population…”, 55. 95% of Javakheti’s population are Armenian; 
Matveeva, “The South Caucasus…”, 20. 
26 Yunusov, “Meskhetian Turks…”, at http://kavkaz.memo.ru/bookstext/books/id/409932.html#i7  
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beliefs that have been widely reproduced in literature on the issue. In fact, very 
little is known about the popular attitudes in the region. 
 
 
2. Azerbaijan  
 
The total number of Meskhetian Turks in Azerbaijan is 90-110,000 of whom an 
estimated 48,000 are refugees from Uzbekistan. Meskhetian Turks first came to 
Azerbaijan in 1957 from Central Asia. According to the 1989 Soviet census, there 
were 17,700 Meskhetian Turks in Azerbaijan, of whom only 4% lived in urban 
areas. Some 5,000 are believed to have arrived from Russia during the 1990s, and 
a few hundreds arrived from Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan proper during the 
1991-1994 war. 
 
Most of the first wave of Meskhetian Turkish refugees from the Ferghana Valley 
settled in the Saatli and Sabirabad region and the regions of Khachmaz, Beylagan 
and Baku.27 Today there are Meskhetian Turkish communities in 46 different 
regions of Azerbaijan. As a rule, those Meskhetian Turks who have resided in 
Azerbaijan for the longest  are in the best socio-economic position. Due to 
linguistic and cultural similarities, Meskhetian Turks live in relative harmony 
with the local Azeris. This  partly explains the community’s considerable size in 
the republic, though Azerbaijan’s proximity to Georgia has also attracted 
Meskhetian Turkish migration to the country. In general, there is no official 
discrimination against the Meskhetian Turks living in Azerbaijan.  According to 
the republic’s ‘Law on Citizenship’ of 1998 those Meskhetian Turks with status 
as refugees or IDPs (internally displaced persons) are eligible to obtain Azeri 
citizenship. However, according to some sources, most of the Meskhetian Turks 
have not acquired citizenship and many of the Meskhetian Turkish refugees and 
IDPs do not receive the free social service, health care and education they are 
                                                
27 Ibid.; Personal correspondence with Yunusov in 23.9.2003. 
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entitled to according to the 1999 ‘Law on Social Protection of Forcibly Displaced 
Persons and Refugees.’28 
 
 
3. Ukraine  
 
An estimated 10,000 Meskhetian Turks reside in Ukraine, constituting the 
country’s youngest national minority. The majority arrived to Ukraine in 1989-
1990 following ethnic persecution in the Ferghana Valley in Uzbekhistan; most 
others immigrated later to re-unite with their relatives. The Meskhetian Turks live 
almost exclusively in rural areas scattered over twelve different regions, with the 
majority, according to the 2001 census in Ukraine, in the regions of Donetsk 
(about 1,700), Kyiv, Mykolayiv (about 1,000) and Kherson (about 1,000). 29 
 
Ninety percent had lived in rural areas prior to their arrival and only a tenth were 
born in Georgia before the Meskhetian Turks’ initial forced resettlement. An 
estimated 20% have arrived via different regions and countries from Uzbekistan 
to Ukraine (mostly through Voronezh, Kursk, Stavropol and Krasnodar regions in 
the Russian Federation as well as Azerbaijan). According to a sociological survey 
in 1998 almost all of the local Meskhetian Turks considered their living standards 
in Uzbekistan twice as high as compared to Ukraine. By 1998, 89.4% had 
received Ukrainian citizenship, the rest have had few problems in acquiring 
propiska, and some are citizens of Azerbaijan, Russia or Uzbekistan. According 
to a study conducted in 2001, the majority (56.4%) of the Meskhetian Turks have 
not experienced discrimination or injustice because of their ethnic origin, whereas 
the rest (43,6%) have experienced various kinds of popular discrimination.30 
                                                
28 FMP OSI, Meskhetian Turks…”, 13. ”World Refugee Survey 2003 Country Report”, U.S. 
Committee for Refugees, Information by Country at 
http://www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/europe/2003/azerbaijan.cfm. 
29 Olena Malinovska, “Meskhetian Turks in Ukraine” (Kiev, Ukraine, 1999), a report based on a 
sociological survey on Meskhetian Turks in Ukraine conducted in 1998 (1255 persons, or an 
estimated 12% of the researchers’ assumed 10,000 strong Meskhetian Turkish population were 
surveyed for the study). Personal correspondence with Malinovska 9.10.2003. 
30 Ibid. 
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4. Russia  
 
An estimated 50-70,000 Meskhetian Turks reside in Russia, of whom 40-60,000 
are assumed to be forced migrants from Uzbekistan. 17,000 Meskhetian Turks 
were evacuated from Ferghana Valley to Central Russia; however, due to the 
unfamiliar climate and overall difficult conditions 6-7,000 Meskhetian Turks have 
left Russian cities such as Oryol, Tver and Smolensk, mostly to other regions of 
Russian and Azerbaijan. Approximately 10,000 Meskhetians, who already lived 
in the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic before 1989, possessed 
propiskas. For those Meskhetian Turks who have resettled to Russia from 
Uzbekistan since 1989 no long-term integration programs have been 
implemented.31 At present, Krasnodar Krai remains the only region where 
Meskhetian Turks have been widely denied propiska and citizenship. Meskhetian 
Turks live almost exclusively in the rural areas of the Russian Federation and  
communities of more than 100 households are rare.32 
                                                
31 Osipov, (1996; 1999; 2003; personal correspondence with Osipov); Sergei Ryazantsev, “Ethnic 
Migration and Condition of the Meskhetian Turks at the South of Russia”, an unpublished report 
prepared for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Danish Refugee 
Council, (Stavropol, 2000). 
32 For recommendations and concerns for the Russian Federation regarding the Meskhetian 
Turkish population in Krasnodar Krai and Cossack organizations in the country, see United 
Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 62nd session 3-21 March 2003 
“Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Russian 
Federation 21/03/2003. (CERD/C/62/CO/7)”, at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/CERD.C.62.CO.7.En?Open document; On the 
implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by the 
Russian Federation see “Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Resolution ResCMN(2003)9 
10.7.2003”, at 
https://wcm.coe.int/rsi/common/renderers/rend_standard.jsp?DocId=51325&SecMode=1&SiteNa
me=cm&Lang=en; and Council of Europe’s “Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention 
for the protection of National Minorities – Opinion on the Russian Federation 13.9.2002” at 
http://www.coe.int/T/E/human_rights/Minorities/2._FRAMEWORK_CONVENTION_(MONITO
RING)/2._Monitoring_mechanism/4._Opinions_of_the_Advisory_Committee/1._Country_specifi
c_opinions/ACFC_INF_OP_I(2003)005%20E%20Opinion%20Russian%20Federation.asp#TopOf
Page; European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (CoE) country reports (1&2) on the 
Russian Federation: First “Country-report”  on 26 Jan 1999, at http://www.coe.int/T/E/human%5 
Frights/ecri/5%2DArchives/1%2DECRI%27s%5Fwork/1%2DCountry%5Fby%5Fcountry/Russia
n%5FFederation/Russian_Federation_CBC_1.asp#TopOfPage and “Second  country-report” in 
13.11.2001, at http://www.coe.int/t/E/human_rights/ecri/1-ECRI/2-Country-
bycountry_approach/Russian_Federation/ Russian_Federation_CBC_2.asp; and for a detailed 
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Krasnodar Krai: 16-18,000 Meskhetian Turks live in the region, or 0.3% of the 
Krai’s total population. An estimated 3,000 arrived prior to 1989. After the 
Ferghana Valley progroms, an estimated 13,600 arrived from Uzbekistan. 10-
12,000 people have been denied propiska by the local authorities, making the 
population effectively stateless and resulting in the absence of basic civil and 
human rights, i.e. employment, personal documents, social/medical benefits, 
property ownership and right to higher education and the registration of 
marriages. In general, the local authorities and the local media depict the 
Meskhetian Turks as illegal immigrants, or as a transit-population that poses a 
threat to the region. The Meskhetian Turks have also become the target of 
physical harassment and violence exerted by local Cossacks. Overall, the 
Meskhetian Turks’ situation and living conditions in Krasnodar Krai are by far the 
worst in comparison to other regions and republics with Meskhetian Turk 
populations.33  
 
Stavropol Krai: 3,500-5,000 Meskhetian Turks reside in the Krai. Some twenty 
Meskhetian Turkish families arrived in the Stavropol Krai in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s from Central Asia, invited by the local authorities to work in the 
agricultural sector. After the events of 1989 in the Ferghana Valley, an estimated 
2,000 people arrived from Uzbekistan. Furthermore, around 2,700 Meskhetian 
Turks have arrived from the Chechen Republic to the Krai in 1994-1996, most of 
whom have been registered as internally displaced persons (IDPs). Interestingly 
some of the local Meskhetian Turkish activists and leaders are female. 
 
Furthermore, there are an estimated 15-20,000 Meskhetian Turks in Rostov 
oblast’; 5,000-5,500 in the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria; 4,000-5,500 in 
                                                                                                                                
overview of the situation in Russia, see Alexander  Osipov, “The Situation and Legal Status of 
Meskhetians in Russian Federation”, Memorial Human Rights Centre, (Moscow 2003). 
33 The most detailed and insightful reports of the Meskhetian Turks’ situation in Southern Russia 
are:  Ryazantsev (2000); Osipov (1996, 1999, 2003); for legal aspects of the issue in Southern 
Russia see Osipov: (2003); See also Anton Popov, “Ethnic Minorities and Migration Processes in 
Krasnodar Territory”, 1Central Asia and the Caucasus Journal of Social and Political Studies 
(2002) 13  1  
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Belgorod oblast’; 4,500-5,000 in Volgograd oblast’; 3,500-5,000 in Voronezh 
oblast’; and smaller Meskhetian Turkish populations in the oblast’s of Kursk, 
Astrakhan, Orenburg, Oryol, Tula (100-200), Tversk and Smolensk, and the 
republics of Kalmykia and Chechnya (approx. 1,300). Some of the Meskhetian 
Turkish populations of the Volgograd, Kursk and Belgorod oblast’s have been  
forcefully resettled three times (1944/Georgia, 1989/Uzbekistan and 
1990s/Georgia during Gamsakhurdia’s rule), and predominantly consider 
themselves Georgians. The bulk of Tversk and Smolensk oblast’s Meskhetian 
Turkish population has moved from the areas where they were initially resettled 
after the Ferghana Valley pogrom, mostly to the southern regions of the Russian 
Federation. Tula oblast’ provides an interesting example of good interethnic 
relations, where the local population even take pride in their small Meskhetian 
Turkish population. Contrary to the myths that Cossacks and Meskhetian Turks 
are unable to live together in harmony, Volgograd and Rostov stand out with 
largely harmonious interethnic relations. The Meskhetian Turks in Kabardino-
Balkaria are largely economic migrants from the 1950-70s with a smaller post-
1989 forced migrant population from Uzbekistan.  
 
5. Uzbekistan 
 
It is commonly believed that Uzbekistan today has a 10-15,000 strong Meskhetian 
Turkish population. Although at present the local Meskhetian Turks’ conditions in 
the republic are relatively stable, the ethnic strife of 1989 has left many wary of a 
possible reccurrence. Economically, many of those who stayed have recuperated 
their losses. Many have chosen assimilation to the dominant Uzbek culture and 
adopted Uzbek and Russian languages, rather than promoting original identities 
and language. Many Meskhetian Turks see President Islam Karimov’s 
authoritarian rule as a guarantor of interethnic harmony and political stability in 
the country. Although cultural activities – including cultural centers – for national 
minorities are permitted by the government, pledges are not matched with 
funding, leaving the Meskhetian Turkish community largely in limbo. 
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Furthermore, many local Meskhetian Turks are registered as Azeris, Uzbeks or 
Turks, making it impossible to determine their exact numbers in the republic, but 
also, ironically, giving many better prospects for employment than a genuine 
declaration of identity. Unlike in most other republics, Meskhetian Turks in 
Uzbekistan have become largely urbanized, and undertake many entrepreneurial 
activities. This has translated into relative affluence, which, on the other hand, has 
made the Uzbek government reluctant to accommodate any outward migration of 
Meskhetian Turks from the republic. The community’s mobilization is frail, due 
largely to the aforementioned anxiety of Meskhetian Turks to assert their 
ethnicity, and also to the relatively high rate of interethnic marriages. This, 
coupled with the lack of any political leverage in the republic’s domestic politics 
has left the local Meskhetian Turks balancing between a fragile interethnic 
tranquility and efforts to maintain their diminishing cultural traditions and 
language. Otherwise, very little is known about the Meskhetian Turkish 
population in Uzbekistan. 34 
 
6. Kazakhstan 
 
An estimated 90-100,000 Meskhetian Turks reside in Kazakhstan, mostly in the 
southern regions of Shymkent and Almaty bordering Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. 
Over 28,000 deportees from Georgia were resettled to Kazakhstan. More than 
17,000 arrived to the republic from Uzbekistan immediately after the 1989 ethnic 
violence in Ferghana Valley. In general, very little is known about the Meskhetian 
Turkish population in Kazakhstan.35 
 
7. Kyrgyzstan 
 
                                                
34 Yunusov, “Meskhetian Turks...”, at 
http://kavkaz.memo.ru/bookstext/books/id/409933.html#i17; OSI FMP, “Meskhetian Turks...”, 
14-16; OSI FMP (1998) estimates the number of Meskhetian Turks in Uzbekistan at 40 thousand, 
but also acknowledges that it is very difficult to obtain any data apart from vague estimates. 
35 Yunusov, “Meskhetian Turks...”, at http://kavkaz.memo.ru/bookstext/books/id/409933.html#i2. 
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According to a census carried out in Kyrgyzstan, 33,327 Meskhetian Turks, or 
0,7% of the whole population, lived in the republic of Kyrgyzstan in 1999. The 
main areas of their settlement are the regions of Batkensk, Dzhalal-Abadsk, Osh, 
Talass, Chuis and Bishkek. Otherwise it is estimated that the population figure 
today is between 25,000-30,000.36 There are two distinct groups of Meskhetian 
Turks living in the republic: firstly, those who were deported from Georgia in 
1944 (over 10,500) and their descendants. This group resides mainly in the Osh 
region bordering Uzbekistan. The second group consists of those who arrived 
later, especially refugees from neighboring Uzbekistan after 1989. According to 
some sources over 12,000 arrived in the country after the events in the Ferghana 
Valley.37 Otherwise, very little is known about the Meskhetian Turkish population 
in Kyrgyzstan. 
 
8. Turkey 
 
It is estimated that there are 25,000-30,000 Meskhetian Turks living in Turkey. 
There are two main groups: Meskhetian Turks who arrived from the late 19th 
Century until Stalin’s repression and World War II from Georgia, and their 
descendants; and those who have arrived from various former Soviet republics 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The latter constitutes a more 
distinguishable group and a majority, while the former  is rather indistinguishable 
as a group and has largely assimilated into  local society. Moreover, many 
amongst the latter group have arrived to study or have come illegally, making 
estimates of the total Meskhetian Turkish population in Turkey very difficult. 
Some sources estimate the total number of Meskhetian Turks to be closer to 
30,000 rather than 25,000.  
 
                                                
36 Correspondence with IOM in Kyrgyzstan; Yunusov, “Meskhetian Turks…”, at 
http://kavkaz.memo.ru/bookstext/books/id/409933.html#i13. 
37 Personal correspondence with the Center of Sociological Research of the Kyrgyz National 
Academy of Science, Biskek, Kyrgyzstan in 13.10.2003. 
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Many of the pre-1944 immigrants resettled in the southern (Hatay – border with 
Syria) and eastern (Agri – border with Iran and Igdir – border with Armenia) 
regions of the country. Post-Soviet Meskhetian Turkish migrants have also 
resettled in the eastern regions (Igdir and Erzurum), but also in western (Bursa 
and Inegol) Turkey and urban areas in general. 
 
In 1992, the Turkish government passed a law that allowed the resettlement of 
500 Meskhetian Turkish families from Russia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to the country. The resettlement program was 
accomplished in 1994 and contrary to initial plans, the government ceased to 
support Meskhetian Turkish migration to Turkey largely because of fears of 
prompting an unmanageable volume of immigration from Central Asia. 
 
The 12,000 who arrived before 1997 are entitled to the status of “national 
refugee” that guarantees them access to healthcare and education, prospects for 
citizenship, and working permits.38 As a whole, integration has been relatively 
successful; nevertheless, many have returned to their country of previous 
residence for various reasons, including difficulties adapting to the relatively 
modern lifestyle in Turkey and difficulties in finding work. In the eyes of some 
traditional Meskhetian Turkish communities in the former Soviet republics, 
Turkey is seen as somewhat ‘morally corrupt’, a country where traditional values 
are declining. On the other hand, many of those who have arrived in the country 
appreciate the relative security and stability in Turkey and have given up further 
demands for resettlement to Georgia. The major problems facing most 
Meskhetian Turkish communities in Turkey are economic. Jobs are hard to find 
due to the fact that (post-) Soviet educational achievements are not recognized 
and also because of the prevailing economic conditions in the country. Housing 
and land are also in many cases beyond their reach making many feel like “long-
term tourists” and adding to their frustration. The Turkish government provides 
                                                
38 Sumbadze, “Muslim Population…”, 48. 
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the communities with little, if any, financial support, but on the other hand it does 
not prosecute Meskhetian Turks who live illegally in the country.39 
 
 
 
III. Meskhetian Turks’ Organizations 
 
In terms of organizational life, the most prominent Meskhetian Turkish 
organizations have been  the International Society Vatan (“Homeland” in Turkish) 
and Hsna (“Salvation” in Georgian), which was succeeded by the Union of 
Georgian Repatriates when the latter ceased to exist in 1999. 
 
Vatan was established in 1990 (registered in 1991) and is the largest of the 
organizations, although the degree to which it enjoys wide support among 
Meskhetian Turks is disputed. In some communities, Vatan is not even known. 
The organization has two main goals: the formal recognition of the unjust 
deportation of 1944 and official permission to return to the ‘homeland’.40 Its main 
office is based in Moscow with representations in Krasnodar Krai and Azerbaijan. 
It has been accused of advocating repatriation at the expense of overlooking more 
acute problems related to the integration of Meskhetian Turks into the societies 
where they currently live.41 Vatan suffered maybe its most serious setback in June 
2003 when its founder and director Yusuf Sarvarov passed away, putting the 
future of the organization, according to some accounts, in uncertainty.42 
                                                
39 Interviews with the chairman, Murtaza Hocaoğlu, and members of Ahiska Refugee Turks’ 
Cultural and Social Assistance Association in Bursa; the vice-chairman of The Federation of 
Ahiska Turks’ Associations, Hamit Muzafferoğlu, and other committee members in 3.9.2003 in 
Bursa, Turkey; Interview with the chairman of Ahiska Türkleri Yardimlasma ve Dayanisma 
Dernegi (Ahiska Turks’ Association for Assistance and Solidarity), Mevlüt Temindaroğlu in 
Bursa; Interview with the chairman of Ahiska Turks’ Educational, Cultural and Social Assistance 
Association, Rüstem Mürseloğlu, in 1.9.2003 in Istanbul, Turkey. Yunusov, “Meskhetian 
Turks…”, at http://kavkaz.memo.ru/bookstext/books/id/409933.html#i13; Ali Gürlek, “Ahıska 
Türklüğü”, at http://moyarodina.sitemynet.com/ali/aliindex.htm.  
40 FMP OSI, ”Meskhetian Turks...”, 41. 
41 Sumbadze, “Muslim Population…”, 52. 
42 Correspondence with the vice-chairman of the International Society – Vatan, Fuad Pepinov in 
17.7.2003. Correspondence with Alexander Osipov in 29.8.2003. 
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Hsna, which was founded in Kabardino-Balkaria (North Caucasus, Russia) in 
1992 with the assistance of the Georgian government, mostly enjoyed support in 
Georgia until 1999 when it ceased to exist. It also maintained representatives in 
Krasnodar Krai. Hsna strongly advocated repatriation, not only to Samtskhe-
Javakheti as Vatan does, but also to Georgia in general. Unlike Vatan, Hsna posed 
no demands for special cultural rights upon possible repatriation. Hsna held the 
view that Meskhetian Turks are ethnic Georgians who converted to Islam, while 
Vatan believes that Meskhetian Turks are essentially ethnic Turks. At present, the 
Union of Georgian Repatriates (UGR) based in Tbilisi, is the main Meskhetian 
Turkish NGO. It advocates repatriation and helps the few repatriates to adapt and 
promote their rights in Georgia. Its activities include conflict prevention and 
interethnic tolerance-promoting projects funded by the Council of Europe. It also 
organizes some legal assistance and Georgian language tuition for the returnees.43 
 
Vatan, Hsna and UGR have agreed on the need for the Georgian government to 
introduce a legislative framework that could facilitate repatriation.44 However, the 
dispute over the origins of the Meskhetian Turks as well as disagreement over the 
ethnopolitical status of the returnees have estranged the organizations and, 
therefore, considerably weakened their common cause. The lack of consensus on 
these key issues has also effectively deprived Meskhetian Turk communities of a 
united and effective vanguard to promote claims of repatriation and human rights. 
 
Apart from Vatan, UGR and Hsna there are and have been other Meskhetian Turk 
organizations in Georgia. They are mostly active in promoting the Meskhetian 
Turks’ cause in Georgia and assisting the local community in Georgia. Presently 
active organizations include Union PATRIA and Youth Union of Deported 
Meskhetians ‘Meskheti’ based in Tbilisi.45 In Tashkent, Uzbekistan, local 
                                                
43 Interview with Marat Baratashvili, the chairman of UGR, in Tbilisi, Georgia in 11.11.2003. 
44 FMP OSI, “Meskhetian Turks...”, 45. 
45 Correspondence with Marat Baratashvili – Chairman of UGR. See also Sumbadze, “Muslim 
Population…”, 52. 
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Meskhetian Turks come together in the Meskhetian Turks’ Cultural Centre. Umit 
(“Hope” in Turkish) was based in Krasnodar Krai in Southern Russia and 
endorsed migration of Meskhetian Turks to Turkey. However, it ceased to exist in 
1999. Kyrgyzstan has two organizations, the Association of Turks Residing in 
Kyrgyzstan and the International Federation of Ahiska Turks of the CIS 
Countries. Like Umit, they support resettlement of Meskhetian Turks to Turkey. 
 
Turkey has, according to some accounts, almost twenty Meskhetian Turkish 
organizations and associations, of which around fifteen are more active and 
influential. In August 2003, Ahiska Türk Dernekleri Federasyon (The Federation 
of Ahiska Turks’ Associations) was founded by nine organizations in an attempt 
to consolidate the diversified Meskhetian Turks’ organizational settings in 
Turkey. The Federation is based in Bursa, which  hosts the bulk of the country’s 
Meskhetian Turkish population. Bursa is also the home to Turkey’s single biggest 
Meskhetian Turkish organization, Ahiskali Göcmen Turkleri Kültür ve Sosyal 
Yardimlasma Derneği (Ahiska Refugee Turks’ Cultural and Social Assistance 
Association). The official line of most of the organizations is to consider 
themselves as ‘özbeöz’ (‘genuine Turks’), who have returned to their ‘homeland’, 
i.e. Turkey/Anatolia. This discourse is challenged by some, including an Istanbul-
based Ahiska Türkleri Eğitim, Kültür ve Sosyal Yardimlasma Derneği (Ahiska 
Turks’ Educational, Cultural and Social Assistance Association) which maintains 
repatriation to southwest Georgia as its main goal. Apart from being maybe the 
most active Meskhetian Turkish publisher in the country – productions include a 
bi-annual journal and film production – the Association is particularly active in 
promoting higher-education among the Meskhetian Turkish youth in an attempt to 
foster an intelligentsia for the community, something that it has traditionally 
lacked.46 Most of the organizations, including the Federation, work to assist 
newcomers in adaptation and practical matters. 
                                                
46 Interviews on 1-3.9.2003 with the Chairman, Murtaza Hocaoğlu, and members of Ahiska 
Refugee Turks’ Cultural and Social Assistance Association in Bursa; the vice-chairman of the 
Federation of Ahiska Turks’ Associations, Hamit Muzafferoğlu, and other committee members in 
Bursa; the chairman of Ahiska Turks’ Association for Assistance and Solidarity, Mevlüt 
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In sum, the organizational setting of Meskhetian Turks is geographically 
dispersed and divided by different orientations. The primary problem of the 
Meskhetian Turk organizations is a lack of cohesiveness and co-operation. Well 
organized, a group of 270-335,000 people could potentially wield significant 
influence as an advocacy group. Although the goals of these organizations vary 
significantly, there is certainly common ground for them to work in closer co-
operation, thus making more tangible progress on issues of concern to the 
Meskhetian Turks. While there seems to be consensus among the organizations on 
Georgia’s need to establish a clear and functioning legal framework for the 
repatriation, the organizations exhibit very little concord or co-operation on 
almost all other issues. 
 
IV. The International Dimension of the Meskhetian Turkish Issue until 1998 
 
From the collapse of the Soviet Union through 1996, the issue of the Meskhetian 
Turks received almost no international attention, as the international community 
in this period focused on the violent conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and in the 
former Soviet Union. The May 1996 “Regional Conference to address the 
problems of refugees, displaced persons, other forms of involuntary displacement 
and returnees in the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States and 
relevant neighbouring States” (also known as the ‘CIS Conference’), organized 
jointly by OSCE, UNHCR and IOM (Organization for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and International 
Organization for Migration) write in full here if you want to, see below), however, 
addressed the problem of involuntarily displaced people, refugees and returnees in 
the countries of the CIS. The declaration of the Conference stated that 
 
                                                                                                                                
Temindaroğlu in Bursa; the chairman of Ahiska Turks’ Educational, Cultural and Social 
Assistance Association, Rüstem Mürseloğlu, in Istanbul. 
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“(p)ersons belonging to formerly deported peoples have the 
right to voluntary return, including ensuring transit travel, 
uninhibited transportation of property which belongs to them 
and assistance in integrating in their historical homeland.”47 
 
Hence, the international community formally recognized the Meskhetian Turk 
resettlement issue, and although it yielded few concrete results, it was the first 
step towards international involvement. In 1998, reports from IOM (you have 
already used it without explanation, Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the Federal 
Union of European Nationalities (FUEN) brought wider international attention to 
the issue.48  
 
1. The Hague and Vienna Meetings of 1998 and 1999 
 
On 7 to 10 September 1998, the OSCE High Commissioner on National 
Minorities (OSCE-HCNM), Max van der Stoel, in cooperation with UNHCR and 
the Forced Migration Projects of the Open Society Institute (FMP-OSI) hosted 
consultations on issues relating to Meskhetian Turks. Representatives of the 
governments of the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan and Georgia, as well as 
representatives of Meskhetian Turks living in these countries and representatives 
of the international organization Vatan took part in the meeting. To a great extent 
the discussion was side-tracked by a heated debate on the issue of terminology. 
As a result of the meeting, however, the term “Meskhetian Turks” was adopted by 
                                                
47 “Regional Conference to address the problems of refugees, displaced persons, other forms of 
involuntary displacement and returnees in the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States and relevant neighbouring States”, (CISCONF/1996/5 11 June 1996), (Geneva, 30 - 31 May 
1996), at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/home/+rwwBmem8Z69wwwwnwwwwwwwhFqA72ZR0gRfZNtFqrpGdBnqBAFqA
72ZR0gRfZNcFqmgfIMzmAwwwwwwwDzmxwwwwwww/opendoc.htm  
48 IOM, “Focus on the Meskhetians of the Former Soviet Union – the Deported People That 
History Has Forgotten”, IOM News(1998) No: 2 is a general report on the Meskhetian Turks 
recognizing that “relatively little is known about the Meskhetians in exile” Human Rights Watch, 
“Russian Federation: Ethnic Discrimination in Southern Russia”, (D1008); The report recognizes 
human rights violations and acts of violence against Meskhetian Turks in Krasnodar Krai., 
(August 1998), at http://www.hrw.org/reports98/russia/. FUEN, “The Problem of the Repatriation 
of the Meskhets-Turks”, (Nov 1998); The FUEN publication is a  more extensive report on 
Meskhetian Turks issue with regard to the repatriation.  
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all participants to be used in the meeting’s end document. Although Georgian 
representatives preferred the term ‘Meskhetians’, referring to the alleged 
Georgian ethnicity of the population group, the delegates agreed on using the term 
‘Meskhetian Turks’ for the purposes of the document only. Today, the term 
‘Meskhetians’ is commonly used in Georgia, while in other countries of 
settlement in the FSU, the group is usually designated ‘Meskhetian Turks’. 
 
The meeting managed to address a number of additional issues, such as: 
exchanging more information on the situation of the Meskhetian Turks among all 
concerned parties; attracting the attention of the international community to the 
issue; emphasizing the importance of full political rehabilitation; respect for 
human rights; decreasing the number of stateless Meskhetian Turks; developing 
programs of ethnic tolerance in the regions of Meskhetian Turks’ residence and 
the necessity to follow the principles laid down in the 1996 CIS Conference.49 
Another important goal was to set up a framework for future activities related to 
the issue. In its publication following the Hague consultations, the Open Society 
Institute called for extensive demographic research to be conducted in order to 
help define Meskhetian Turk communities, thereby avoiding policy-making based 
on vague estimates. Such research largely remains to be conducted. 
 
A follow-up meeting to The Hague consultations took place the following year in 
Vienna. The second informal consultation (15 to 17 March 1999) were also 
hosted and organized by OSCE, UNHCR and FMP OSI. All the bodies that were 
represented in the Hague meeting were present in addition to government officials 
from Turkey, Ukraine, USA and the Council of Europe. The questions of 
rehabilitation, repatriation and regularization of Meskhetian Turks’ status in their 
places of residence were brought up at the meeting.50 However, the consultations 
did not result in any concrete measures. The delegation from the Russian 
                                                
49 “Document of The Hague Meeting on the Issues Relating to the Meskhetian Turks” in FMP 
OSI,  “Meskhetian Turks…”, 66-70 
50 OSCE “Annual Report 1999 on OSCE Activities”, 
(1 December 1998 - 31 October 1999), at http://www.osce.org/docs/english/misc/anrep99e.htm  
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Federation refused any commitments with regard to the Meskhetian Turks’ legal 
integration into Russian society. Moreover, it was argued by the same delegation 
that the repatriation of Meskhetian Turks to Georgia should be the primary goal 
for all efforts. Nonetheless the meeting did not lead to any concrete action plan 
for the Russian Federation.51 
 
Georgia’s delegation pledged to solve the question of citizenship for returnees by 
the end of 1999 and announced the establishment of a State Committee, or 
Repatriation Service, in the near future to address issues relating to the 
repatriation of Meskhetian Turks. Although the committee indeed was established 
the following month, it can be argued that it had more to do with Georgia’s 
aspirations to join the Council of Europe than a desire to effectively solve the 
issue of repatriation. It seems that obligations undertaken by the Georgian 
government routinely do not translate into action, and technicalities frequently 
inhibit implementation of laws in issues related to Meskhetian Turks. This has 
also been the case for returnees opting for Georgian citizenship.  
 
Georgia applied for membership of the Council of Europe in 1996 and shortly 
after the Vienna consultations on the Meskhetian Turk issue, in April 1999, 
Georgia was accepted as the forty-first member of the organization. The Council 
of Europe’s involvement at the Vienna consultations on the Meskhetian Turk 
issue was a part of its strategy to monitor and encourage Georgia to fulfill the 
stipulated obligations and conditions for its membership, i.e. conditionality. 
 
The participants in the Vienna meeting welcomed invitations by Azerbaijan and 
Georgia to hold follow-up consultations in late 1999 and mid-2000 in Azerbaijan 
and Georgia respectively. However, these consultations never materialized. The 
policy window that had opened with the Hague consultations closed abruptly, as 
the international community’s attention shifted to more pressing issues. The 
                                                
51 Osipov, “The Situation and Legal Status…”, 8. 
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beginning of the Kosovo crisis in the following month marked the suspension of 
further consultations and effectively meant a return to the pre-1998 situation. 
 
Many of the steps forward that were taken on the issue can arguably be attributed 
to the initial efforts of the OSCE-HCNM, Max van der Stoel. With his retirement 
from the post in 2000, one of the most prominent advocates for a solution to the 
resettlement issue was lost. In the absence of further consultations, it was 
anticipated at the time that the Council of Europe would take a leading role in the 
issue.52 However, it is evident today (August 2004) that since spring 1999, the 
overall impetus, attention and coordinated efforts by the international community 
on the issue have largely subsided. 
 
2. Georgia’s Entry to the Council of Europe 
 
Georgia’s entry to the Council of Europe offered a window of opportunity for 
finding a durable solution to the issue of repatriation. The link between Georgia’s 
full membership in Council of Europe and the progress made on Meskhetian 
Turks’ repatriation to Georgia was officially confirmed by the Head of the State 
Repatriation Service in December 1998.53 On 29 January the following year, a 
text adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe stated the 
organization’s expectation for Georgia to adopt a legal framework to 
accommodate the repatriation of Meskhetian Turks, thus marking the Council of 
Europe’s taking on a more active role on the issue.54 In April 1999, the Council of 
Europe participated in the Vienna consultations. 
 
                                                
52 Telephone interview with late Mr Arthur C. Helton, Director of Peace and Conflict Studies, and 
Senior Fellow, Refugee Studies and Preventive Action at the Council of Foreign Relations in New 
York (Former director of OSI FMP), on 25.7.2003. 
53 Liz Fuller (RFE \RL), “Georgian Repatriation Service Head Interviewed” at 
http://www.rferl.org/caucasus-report/1998/12/42-161298.html  
54 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, “Georgia’s Application for Membership of the 
Council of Europe”, text adopted by the Assembly on 27 January 1999, at 
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=http%3A%2F%2Fassembly.coe.int%2Fdocuments%2Fado
ptedtext%2Fta99%2Feopi209.htm#1  
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As a condition for accession to the Council of Europe, Georgia committed to 
adopt a legislative framework permitting repatriation and integration of 
Meskhetian Turks into Georgian society. In addition, it stipulated Meskhetian 
Turks’ right to obtain Georgian citizenship.55 The legal framework was to be 
accomplished within two years and the repatriation was to be facilitated within 
twelve years of Georgia’s accession to the Council of Europe. Two draft laws 
were prepared: One by the Repatriation Service headed by a Georgian politician 
and human-rights activist, Guram Mamulia, along with five NGOs; the other by 
Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (GYLA) on behalf of the Ministry for 
Refugee Issues. In the ensuing hearings by the National Security Council and the 
Parliamentary Committee on Civic Integration, the latter draft law was adopted as 
a basis for further elaborations. Both the Council of Europe and UNHCR 
provided consultations to Georgia with respect to the draft law. After a meeting of 
Georgian delegates and legal experts of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg in 
March 2001, and subsequent changes, the draft law was passed to the Ministry of 
Justice in Tbilisi.56 
 
The draft law stipulates, inter alia, that in order to acquire Georgian citizenship, a 
returnee has to provide documentation of having been deported in 1944. A 
returnee can apply for citizenship a year after entering Georgia. The current draft 
law does not provide Meskhetian Turks with legal rehabilitation as the Georgian 
government holds that it cannot take responsibility for the deportation as it was 
conducted by another state entity, namely the Soviet Union. However, with the 
enactment of the 1997 ‘Law on Recognizing Citizens of Georgia as Victims of 
Political Reprisals and Social Protection of the Repressed’, Georgia rehabilitated 
other groups of people, including Armenians, Greeks and Georgians that were 
                                                
55 CoE European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, “First Report on Georgia”, 
(Adopted on 22 June 2001), at http://www.coe.int/t/E/human_rights/ecri/1-ECRI/2-Country-by-
country_approach/Georgia/CBC1-Georgia.asp#P184_30012  
56 Sumbadze, “Muslim Population…”, 49-51; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Report, “Georgia: 
Meskhetian issue stirs society” on 25.5.2001 at 
http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2001/05/25052001125503.asp . 
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deported. Through a simple legal procedure these people, accordingly, can restore 
their lost rights and obtain special social protection. 
 
Many legal experts and various organizations that are concerned with the agenda 
of Meskhetian Turks have heavily criticized the draft law. As Georgian law does 
not recognize dual or multiple citizenship, many Meskhetian Turks consider a 
possible repatriation very risky. In practice, the law means that a repatriate has to 
relinquish his/her economic, social and political ties with the former place of 
residence and enter the country with uncertain prospects of acquiring Georgian 
citizenship. Moreover, almost six decades after the deportation it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to provide the local authorities with a document proving one’s or 
one’s ancestors’ deportation.57 
 
On the one hand, Georgia has agreed to establish a framework for repatriation in 
1999 under strong pressure from the international community. On the other hand, 
repatriation remains almost impossible in practice, and visible efforts undertaken 
to prepare for repatriation seemingly serve mainly the purpose of pleasing the 
international community. The efforts of the Georgian Repatriation Service 
towards further repatriation suffered their biggest setback after the draft law it 
developed and duly submitted to the State Commission on the Deported 
Meskhetian Population was rejected without any explanation in early 2001 by the 
Georgian government.58 As a result, Mamulia and his entire staff resigned on 23 
February 2001, after which the Service was disbanded. In an interview before his 
resignation, Mamulia stated that "I say this to my shame, and the shame of my 
generation, that we were not at a sufficiently high level of humanity to resolve 
this problem independently", referring to Georgian government’s refusal to 
                                                
57 Sumbadze, “Muslim Population…”, 49-51. 
58 Guram Mamulia, “Comments on the draft law on repatriation of Meskhetians” sent to 
MINELRES in Tue Jun 5, 2001 and posted at 
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/multiethnic/message/1398. 
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commit itself in attempts to solve the issue, and the need for the international 
community to exert pressure on Georgia in order to make progress.59  
 
In general, advocates of the repatriation of Meskhetian Turks are viewed with 
deep skepticism and mistrust within Georgian politics, and are at times even 
psychologically and physically harassed. The issue of repatriation is very 
sensitive and emotionally charged among the Georgian public. Georgia has been 
extremely reluctant in handling and trying to solve the issue. Any progress that 
has been made can be seen largely as a result of pressure exerted by the 
international community. Although many of Georgia’s actions are not in 
accordance with its international commitments, however, it would be unbalanced 
to claim that the Georgian government’s concerns are only populist or nationalist 
by nature. The republic has suffered severe socio-economic recession since it 
obtained independence. Largely due to the economic depression that followed 
independence, almost twenty percent, or one million of its citizens, left the 
republic during the 1990s. At the same time, the conflicts over Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia have left the country with an estimated 250,000 internally displaced 
persons,60 while the conflict in Chechnya has brought at least four thousand 
refugees to Georgia since 1999.61 
 
In 2001, the Council of Europe urged Georgia “to accelerate the work undertaken 
with the Council of Europe and the UNHCR on the question of the repatriation of 
the deported Meskhetian population” and “granting them the same status of 
rehabilitation as that has already given to deportees of other ethnicities who were 
                                                
59 Liz Fuller (RFE \RL), “Georgian Repatriation Service Head Interviewed” at 
http://www.rferl.org/caucasus-report/1998/12/42-161298.html. Until his death in early 2003, 
Mamulia was the most outspoken advocate of repatriation in Georgian politics.  
60 “OCHA-Georgia Information Bulletin May 2003”, 31 May 2003, UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), at 
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/6b59c0f65ae2ef4149256d410022dde6?OpenDocument. A 
recent Georgian census, conducted in 2002, indicates that the total Georgian population has been 
reduced by almost 20%: from 5.5 million to 4.4 million people in the period from 1989 to 2002. 
The 2002 census did not, unlike the census of 1989, include the breakaway republics of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia. International observers and Georgian officials estimate these territories to be 
home to 160,000 people in Abkhazia and 70,000 people in South Ossetia.  
61 UNHCR Global Report 2002 – Georgia, 399.  
 38
repatriated to Georgia under the Soviet regime”.62 Up to this point, the law has not 
been enacted and it remains in the State Ministry. 
 
3. The Role of Other International Actors 
 
Since the 1996 CIS Conference, the OSCE-HCNM has actively participated in 
trying to resolve the question of Meskhetian Turks. The OSCE-HCNM largely 
prepared The Hague and Vienna consultations. In areas related to the Meskhetian 
Turkish issue, the organization mainly monitors the situation in Samtskhe-
Javakheti, reviews any developments and makes recommendations. The OSCE-
HCNM works closely with the Council of Europe in Georgia. In 1999, the 
OSCE’s annual report stated that the “Meskhetian issue is receiving increased 
attention”.63 A year later its mission to Georgia “expressed concern about the 
slow progress thus far made on implementation of repatriation measures.”64 The 
2001 annual report diplomatically concluded that “the planned repatriation of the 
Meskhetian population deported in 1944 continue to lag behind schedule.”65 The 
only reference to the issue in the 2002 report points out the Meskhetian Turks’ 
prospective return to Samtskhe-Javakheti as complicating the situation further in 
the region. The 2003 report states that the OSCE-HCNM has “continued his work 
concerning the return of the Meskhetians” and has “encouraged dialogue between 
all interested parties including the Meskhetians themselves” in Georgia.66 
 
CoE, UNHCR and OSCE-HCNM are among the most active international 
organizations dealing with the issue. Nevertheless, owing to the 
                                                
62 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1257 (2001), “Honouring of Obligations 
and commitments by Georgia”, at 
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=http%3A%2F%2Fassembly.coe.int%2Fdocuments%2Fado
ptedtext%2Fta01%2Feres1257.htm  
63 OSCE, “Annual Report 1999 on OSCE Activities” at 
http://www.osce.org/docs/english/misc/anrep99e.htm  
64 OSCE, “Annual Report 2000 on OSCE Activities” at 
http://www.osce.org/docs/english/misc/anrep00e_activ.htm  
65 OSCE, “Annual Report 2001 on OSCE Activities” at 
http://www.osce.org/docs/english/misc/anrep01e_activ.htm  
66 OSCE, “Annual Report 2003 on OSCE Activities” at 
http://www.osce.org/documents/sg/2003/05/2677_en.pdf 
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intergovernmental nature of these organizations and due to the relatively weak 
enforcment mechanisms of their mandates, they have been unable to put sufficient 
pressure on relevant countries to undertake the obligations that have been agreed 
upon. In the case of Georgia, conditionality has been the most viable tool to 
accrue international pressure and make progress on the issue. Otherwise, having 
adopted rather inclusive principles in accepting new members, expulsion from the 
organization remains the main mechanism of sanction (of OSCE and CoE). 
However, this tool is unlikely and also liable to backfire against the initial goals. 
 
The UNHCR is strongly in favor of finding a solution to the legal problems of the 
Meskhetian Turks within the framework of Russian law, i.e. acquisition of 
citizenship.67 This view is backed by Vatan. Both parties emphasize that the first 
priority for Meskhetian Turks living in the Russian Federation should be to obtain 
citizenship, after which these people could, on an individual basis, seek asylum in 
the United States, Turkey or elsewhere. UNHCR is continuing its role in 
monitoring the legal and protection aspects of the issue, mainly in Russia, but also 
in Azerbaijan, Georgia and  the Central Asian republics. Nevertheless, the 
organization’s stance is very cautious, to avoid stirring up emotions, e.g. among 
Meskhetian Turks in the republics of Central Asia.68 Overall, among the relevant 
international organizations the active role on the repatriation issue has been left 
exclusively to the Council of Europe. The Council of Europe is increasingly 
putting pressure on Georgia to fulfill its international obligations and 
commitments on various issues, including human rights, while the repatriation 
issue, due to the lack of progress, has moved low on the Council of Europe’s 
Georgian agenda.69 
 
The Forced Migration Projects of the Open Society Institute participated actively 
in The Hague and Vienna consultations. The Institute’s publication on 
                                                
67 Telephone interview with the UNHCR liaison office with the Strasbourg institutions, 
Strasbourg, 15.7.2003. 
68 Telephone interview with the Regional Bureau for Europe/Eastern Europe, UNHCR Geneva, 14 
July 2003. 
69 Ibid. 
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“Meskhetian Turks: Solutions and Human Security” from 1998 is still a 
cornerstone in the English language literature on Meskhetian Turks. The Open 
Society Institute has also funded a number of projects on Meskhetian Turks. 
However, owing to a ‘strategic consolidation’ at OSI, namely the moving of its 
director Arthur C. Helton to the Council on Foreign Relations, the Forced 
Migration Projects ceased to exist in August 1999 and its project on Meskhetian 
Turks was thus terminated.70 
 
Since 1998, the Federal Union of European Nationalities (FUEN), as a minority 
rights lobbying umbrella-organization, has contributed towards putting the 
Meskhetian Turk issue on the agenda of the international community. The 
organization conducted a fact-finding mission to Georgia in 1998, which resulted 
in its representatives’ meeting with representatives of Vatan and the president of 
Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze. The mission report was one of the first more 
detailed English language reports on the issue. The following year another 
mission was conducted to Azerbaijan and Russia in order to further study the 
situation of Meskhetian Turks. FUEN continues to monitor the situation and 
Vatan has become a member organization of the Union. 
 
A new international actor has appeared on the international stage recently, as the 
United States has added Meskhetian Turks from Uzbekistan who are currently 
living in Krasnodar Krai to the list of peoples entitled to asylum in the USA.71 In 
September 2002 officials of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, State 
Department and officials of the United States’ Embassy in Moscow conducted a 
fact-finding mission to Krasnodar Krai. Although it did not prompt an explicit 
change in the United States’ policies vis-à-vis the issue, the trip signaled the 
country’s interest in the issue, and subsequently incited speculations about the 
                                                
70 Telephone interview with late Mr Arthur C. Helton, Director of Peace and Conflict Studies, and 
Senior Fellow, Refugee Studies and Preventive Action at the Council of Foreign Relations in New 
York (Former director of OSI FMP), on 25.7.2003. 
71 Telephone interview with the Immigration and Naturalization Service at the US Embassy in 
Moscow, 17.7.2003. 
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motives behind this interest, namely relieving pressure on Georgia.72  In June 
2003, a meeting concerning the issue of Meskhetian Turks was held in Moscow. 
The meeting, organized by UNHCR with representatives from OSCE, CoE, IOM, 
Vatan, the US embassy in Moscow and Russian government officials addressed 
the issue of the legal situation of the Meskhetian Turks in Russia.  
 
In early 2004, the International Organization for Migration launched an 
information campaign in Krasnodar Krai in early 2004, commissioned by the US 
State Department, to prepare the grounds for a subsequent resettlement of 
possibly thousands of Meskhetian Turks from the region to the United States.73 
Consequently, between June 2004, when the resettlement started, and August, 
about one hundred Meskhetian Turks were resettled to Philadelphia, USA. 
According to IOM representative in Russia, Mark Brown, there is no quota and if 
there are 15,000 willing and qualified for the program all will be accepted.74 
 
 
V. Existing Literature and Its Shortcomings 
 
Research-based academic texts published on Meskhetian Turks based on primary 
sources amount to only a handful of publications, and much of the literature is 
                                                
72 The U.S. Refugee Admission Program for Fiscal Year 2004 urges the State Department to 
provide a priority two (P2) designation, i.e. asylum to the ‘persecuted and stateless Muslim 
religious minority, the Meskhetian Turks in Krasnodar Krai’ in order to ‘relieve the burden on 
Georgia and rescue the Meskhetians from continued persecution…This should, however, be done 
in tandem with diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis Russia to promote citizenship for those…who desire to 
and are entitled to it, and for Georgia to enact legislation facilitating the return of those…who 
have the desire to go back.’ “Recommendations of the Refugee Council USA - U.S. Refugee 
Admissions Program For Fiscal Year 2004”, at 
http://www.refugeecouncilusa.org/rcusa2004doc.pdf, 2,33; there are also suppositions that by 
designating the population group as P2 could bring about migration of other Meskhetian Turks to 
Krasnodar Krai; Telephone conference with late Arthur C. Helton, New York, 25.7.2003). 
73 Caucasian Knot (citing REGNUM News Agency) “10,000 Meskhetian Turks from Kuban 
region to get refugee status in US” (17 February 2004) at   
http://eng.kavkaz.memo.ru/newstext/engnews/id/634171.html.  
74 IOM Press Briefing Note, “Russia - Resettlement of Meskhetian Turks to the United States” at 
http://www.iom.int/en/news/pbn100804.shtml#item3; Mike Eckel, Associated Press, “Persecuted 
Russia Minorities Head to U.S.” at 
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simply re-circulated. One of the first post-Soviet English language publications on 
the Meskhetian Turkish issue was the report by the Federal Union of European 
Nationalities (FUEN): “The Problem of the Repatriation of the Meskhet-Turks” of 
November 199875. The report briefly describes the issues and problems facing 
Meskhetian Turks in the former Soviet Union as well as accounts of Meskhetian 
Turks’ organizations and their demands. A good part of the report is devoted to 
issues related to repatriation. The reasons for Georgia’s reluctance to accept 
Meskhetian Turks’ repatriation are examined in detail. 
 
Shortly after the publication of the FUEN’s report, the Open Society Institute 
(Forced Migration Projects) issued: “Meskhetian Turks: Solutions and Human 
Security” (1998), following the September 1998 Hague Summit.76 It explores 
Meskhetian Turks’ contemporary conditions, including issues of repatriation, 
Meskhetian Turks’ organizations and recommendations. One of the books’ 
recommendations calls for a demographic survey to be conducted on Meskhetian 
Turks’ numbers and location. Although the book (72 pages) is based on research 
mainly in the Caucasus and Uzbekistan, its scientific scope is rather limited as its 
function seems to have been awareness-raising of the issue in general and 
problems faced by Meskhetian Turks. It includes the Hague consultations’ final 
document as an appendix.77  
 
Alexander Osipov, a Russian academic and Program Manager at the Memorial 
Human Rights Center in Moscow, has published a range of reports on legal 
aspects, human rights violations and discrimination vis-à-vis the Meskhetian 
Turks in Southern Russia. His publications include the highly informative “The 
Violation of Forced Migrants and Ethnic Discrimination in Krasnodar Territory – 
the Situation of the Turks-Meskhetians” (“Naruzheniye prav Vynuzhdennih 
                                                
75 Svetlana Chervonnaya (edited by the FUEN-Sectretariat), “Appendix to the Fact-Finding 
Mission of the FUEN - Federal Union of European Nationalities delegation to Georgia”, 
November 1998, (FUEN/Flensburg, Germany, 1998). 
76 Forced Migration Projects of the Open Society Institute, “Meskhetian Turks: Solutions and 
Human Security”, (the Open Society Institute, New York, 1998). 
77 Chairman’s Statement From Vienna Meeting on Meskhetian Turk Issues in 15-17 March 1999 
can be found at http://www.soros.org/fmp2/html/may1999.html. 
 43
Migrantov i Etnicheskaya Diskriminatsiya v Krasnodarskom Kraye”, 1996),  
“Rossiiskii opyt etnicheskoi chistki: Meskhetintsy v Krasnodarskom Kraye” 
(1999) and “The Situation and Legal Status of Meskhetians in the Russian 
Federation” (2003).78 Another report on Meskhetian Turks is “Deported Peoples 
of the Former Soviet Union: The Case of Meskhetian Turks” (IOM) published by 
the United Nations in 1998.79 It is mostly based on interviews of various key 
actors in Georgia and Azerbaijan. Apart from the history of the Meskhetian Turks 
and contemporary politics, and general legal and socio-economic aspects of the 
issue, it discusses the implications of Georgia’s proposed draft law and Georgia’s 
policy proposals for the future. The booklet makes recommendations to the 
governments of the different countries of Meskhetian Turkish residence, 
international organizations and NGOs. 
 
Arif Yunusov’s “Meskhetinskie Turki: Dvazhdy Deportirovan Narod (Meskhetian 
Turks: Twice Deported People)” (2000) is a comprehensive study based on a 
variety of sources.80 The book covers main aspects of the Meskhetian Turkish 
history and contemporary situation, namely origins, current conditions, 
Meskhetian Turks’ organizations and provides recommendations for different 
actors and the question of repatriation. Although it is a complex and thoroughly 
researched piece of work, its limitation for covering all aspects in different 
countries is the fact that it is mainly the result of a single author’s research and 
interviews. They were conducted mostly in the Caucasus, but also material from 
the author’s previous trips to Meskhetian Turk communities Russia, Ukraine and 
Central Asia are utilized in the book. 
 
                                                
78 Alexander Osipov, “Naruzheniye prav Vynuzhdennih Migrantov I Etnicheskaya 
Diskriminatsiya v Krasnodarskom Kraye”, (Memorial, Moscow, Russia, 1996); Osipov, 
“Rossiiskii opyt etnicheskoi chistki: Meskhetintsy v Krasnodarskom Kraye”, (Memorial, Moscow, 
Russia, 1999); Osipov, “The Situation and Legal Status of Meskhetians in the Russian 
Federation”, Memorial, Commissioned by UNHCR, (Moscow, 2003). 
79  “IOM (prepared by Franz Laczko), “Deported Peoples of the Former Soviet Union: The Case of 
Meskhetian Turks”, (IOM/Geneva, Switzerland, 1998).” 
 
80 Yunusov, “Meskhetian Turks…”  
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A publication by the Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, 
CIPDD (ed. Gia Nodia) on “Ethnic-Confessional Groups and Challenges to Civic 
Integration in Georgia” has a chapter on “Muslim Population of Southern 
Georgia: Challenges of Repatriation” (22 pages) by Nana Sumbadze.81 
Sumbadze’s study is a very informative and balanced view of various aspects of 
Meskhetian Turks’ repatriation to Georgia and the issue in general. The book  also 
has a chapter on “The Armenian Community of Javakheti – Collective Memories 
and Current Concerns” by David Darchiashvili and another chapter on “The 
Social, Economic and Political Situation in Javakheti – People’s Concerns, the 
Report of the Sociological Survey” by Marina Elbakidze.  
 
Sergei Ryazantsev’s unpublished report “Ethnic Migration and Condition of the 
Meskhetian Turks at the South of Russia” for UNHCR and the Danish Refugee 
Council is a comprehensive, albeit mostly quantitative survey-based study on 
Meskhetian Turks in Stavropol Krai.82 Due to difficulties with the local 
authorities the study was conducted in Stavropol, and not in Krasnodar Krai. 
Another quantitative country case-study is Olena Malinovska’s “Situation of the 
Refugee Turks-Meskhetins in Ukraine’”.83 It is based on a sociological survey, 
which was conducted among Meskhetian Turkish communities in different 
regions of Ukraine in 1998 with the help of UNHCR. 
 
An unpublished PhD dissertation by British anthropologist Kathryn Tomlinson 
provides an insightful picture of the Meskhetian Turk community in Krasnodar 
Krai.84 Based on one year of anthropological fieldwork in the region, Tomlinson 
gives an apolitical picture of the local Meskhetian Turk community. According to 
                                                
81 Sumbadze, “Muslim Population …” 
82 Sergei Ryazantsev, “Ethnic migration and condition of the Meskhetian Turks at the south of 
Russia”, a study commissioned by UNHCR and Danish Refugee Council, (Stavropol, 2000). 
83 Olena Malinovska (co-authors: Т.Klinchenko, I. Mingazutdinov, O.Shamshur), “Situation of the 
Refugee Turks-Meskhetins in Ukraine”, UNHCR, (Кiev, 1999). 
84 Kathryn Gillian Tomlinson, “Coping as Kin: Responses to Suffering amongst Displaced 
Meskhetian Turks in post-Soviet Krasnodar, Russian Federation”, University College London 
Department of Anthropology, thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy May 2002 
(unpublished). 
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her, the debate over possible repatriation is to a large extent promoted by 
‘unrepresentative’ leaders of the community and the international community, 
which in her opinion could lead to even worse conditions in Krasnodar Krai, 
prompting an expulsion. During her fieldwork, Tomlinson observed a surprising 
absence of bitterness towards those responsible for their forced migration or those 
who failed to allocate them new land in the (former) Soviet Union. She points to 
the need for thinking about the concept of ‘homeland’ and Meskhetian Turks’ 
perceptions of a territorialized homeland. 
 
The idea and concept of home is further studied by Kakoli Ray in her PhD thesis 
"Displaced Populations: Re-shaping International Planning", which was partly 
based on comprehensive fieldwork among Meskhetian Turks in Azerbaijan. Ray 
questions repatriation as the optimal solution for refugees. Furthermore, in her 
article “Repatriation and De-territorialization: Meskhetian Turks’ conception of 
Home”, she argues that the conventional understanding and theories of the idea of 
home and the Meskhetian Turks’ own perceptions of the idea do not match. She 
notes that Meskhetian Turks’ social meaning of home is not fully fixed in time 
and space, and as a result of the particular circumstances, the identities of 
Meskhetian Turks have been de-territorialized. According to Ray, even the 
Meskhetian Turks living in Azerbaijan, let alone Russia and Uzbekistan, have not 
been securely integrated into the local society. 
 
In a word, scholarly literature on Meskhetian Turks does exist, but is scarce. 
Many aspects are left uncovered. On the other hand, other topics are touched upon 
but not explored in depth, or studied in a certain country or region but not in a 
comparative way, such as issues of identity, popular attitudes among the 
populations adjacent to Meskhetian Turkish population groups, perceptions of 
home and homeland, migratory trends, levels of integration and Meskhetian 
Turks’ social organizations. Ultimately, it is these matters that lie at the core of 
the issue, and will consequently decide the success of any attempt to find durable 
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solutions. These matters should thus be taken into account while formulating any 
serious attempts to address the issue in both national and international arenas. 
 
As concluded above, much of the literature is reproduction of research of a few 
experts on the issue. Different advocates related to the issue have voiced the need 
for a comprehensive cross-country study on the population group in question, but 
to no avail. The conclusions of the Hague Consultations refer to the situation of 
the Meskhetian Turks in Krasnodar Krai as a priority issue, and call for the 
conduct of “[…] a survey to determine the precise number, needs and intentions 
of Meskhetian Turks throughout the territory of the former Soviet Union 
concerning resettlement […].”85 The joint UNHCR/OSCE-HCNM/OSI-FMP 
mission to Krasnodar Krai in December 1998, as well as the March 1999 follow-
up consultations in Vienna has also emphasized the need for more research. In the 
chairman’s final statement of the Vienna meeting it was recognized that “attention 
should shift to the exploration of specific solutions that stress humane 
management of their problems,” thus calling for and encouraging more research 
to be done on the Meskhetian Turk issue.86 Furthermore, all participants agreed, 
under the auspices of the OSCE- HCNM, to establish a focal point that would 
“collect and act as depository for project proposals relating to the issues of the 
category of people in question.”87 The OSCE-HCNM Max van der Stoel stated 
after the meeting that “We are at a critical stage of the process, a point at which 
the support of donor governments…could make an important difference… 
(s)olutions to Meskhetian Turk issues... are within reach.”88 However, the planned 
project proposal depository that was should have been presented at the June 1999 
                                                
85 “Document of The Hague meeting on the issues relating to the Meskhetian Turks”, The Hague 
7-10 September 1998, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, The Hague. 
86 Ibid. 
87 The Chairman’s Statement From Vienna Meeting on Meskhetian Turk Issues at 
http://www.soros.org/ fmp2/html/may1999.html#vienna  
88 Open Society Institute’s Forced Migration Alert, ‘OSCE-HCNM Makes Meskhetian Turk 
Appeal’, 14.5.2003, at http://www.soros.org/fmalert/0432.html.  
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CIS Conference follow-up meeting never materialized, due to a shift of priorities 
and a resulting lack of donor interest in the issue.89 
 
The publication of the Forced Migration Projects of the Open Society Institute 
called for a demographic survey to be conducted on the number and location of 
Meskhetian Turks: 
  
“[p]recise data on Meskhetian Turk, including their numbers and 
location, is insufficient. In many cases, experts, advocates, and 
government representatives are forced to rely on vague estimates 
when discussing the repatriation dilemma. Extensive demographic 
research is thus warranted to more clearly define Meskhetian Turk 
community, as well as ascertain the hopes and desires of 
Meskhetian Turks.”90 
 
In 2000, a leading scholar on Meskhetian Turks wrote: 
 
“International organizations must design special research to 
explore the demographic and social picture of the region where 
Meskhetian Turks are going to be repatriated […] There is 
almost no information about exact size of the population of 
Meskhetian Turks and places of their dwelling, the information 
about their ethical beliefs, and social problems of Meskhetian 
Turks are also unknown, the question of how many of them 
actually want to return to their historic homeland is also left 
without the answer.”91  
 
                                                
89 Telephone interview with (late) Arthur C. Helton, Director of Peace and Conflict Studies, 
Senior Fellow, Refugee Studies and Preventive Action at the Council of Foreign Relations in New 
York (Former director of OSI FMP), in 25.7.2003. 
90 FMP OSI, “Meskhetian Turks...”, 58. 
91 Yunusov, “Meskhetian Turks…”, at http://kavkaz.memo.ru/ 
bookstext/books/id/409936.html#i26.  
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There are insightful and valuable reports from studies conducted in Krasnodar and 
Stavropol Krais (South Russia), Ukraine and Georgia, and research on legal 
aspects of the local Meskhetian Turks in the Northern Caucasus, while little is 
known about the Meskhetian Turk communities in Central Asia, notably in 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan as well as in Central Russia and Turkey. 
Moreover, most studies are focused on a particular region or country or on a 
specific issue, while a comparative study is yet to emerge. As the only group of 
deported peoples of the former Soviet Union that have neither been allowed to 
return to their homeland nor rehabilitated, and are in some localities living as a 
stateless population group, Meskhetian Turks are a living reminder of the 
atrocities committed during the Soviet Era. Given the international community’s 
and the concerned countries’ moral concerns and obligations to find durable 
solutions for this exceptionally notorious case of displacement, the relevance of 
the issue for contemporary regional politics and the potential of current and future 
conflict around the question, it is desirable and feasible that qualified research is 
generated. Most importantly, a comprehensive study of the above issues would 
provide the international community and its international organizations with a 
strong tool to seek durable solutions to the problems of the Meskhetian Turks. 
 
VI. Towards a New Discourse? 
 
The problems of the Meskhetian Turks are substantially more complex than is 
commonly perceived. It is difficult to imagine any single solution that would 
deliver a framework, which could be approved by all stakeholders. It can be 
argued that any potential solution should be multi-dimensional, giving references 
to other possible solutions, rather than being vsingle stranded. Repatriation, for 
example, should in principle be a given right, but should also be voluntary and not 
imperative. The issue of repatriation and the problems of the legal status of the 
Meskhetian Turks in Krasnodar Krai are the most prominent features at present; 
paradoxically,  these outcomes are ultimately placed at opposite ends of the 
spectrum of policy options.  
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One crucial question pertains to the likelihood of a large-scale repatriation. 
According to the most vocal Meskhetian Turk organizations, the majority of the 
Meskhetian Turkish population would resettle in Georgia, should a legislative 
framework without hindering bureaucratic obstacles come into being in the future. 
However, other actors, including some international experts, suggest that most 
Meskhetian Turks, e.g. in Russia’s troubled Krasnodar Krai, may wish to remain 
there, should the political and legislative conditions become more 
accommodating. Even more so, this may be the case for Meskhetian Turks settled 
in countries in Central Asia and Azerbaijan, where the Meskhetian Turks appear 
to enjoy a much higher degree of socio-economic and cultural integration. 
Currently, these questions remain little researched and need studies to gain an 
understanding of potential migration trends and the Meskhetian Turks own 
perceptions of territorial identity and notions of belonging. 
 
International organizations have met severe obstacles in defining the major 
directions of assistance for the Meskhetian Turks, both in addressing the issue of 
resettlement and in addressing the protection needs of the often vulnerable 
Meskhetian Turk population groups. Admittedly, the political problems for 
facilitating lasting solutions are immense, both with regard to the legal protection 
of Meskhetian Turks in Southern Russia and elsewhere, and with regard to 
resettlement in Georgia. However, the lack of concise knowledge of the numbers 
and locations of the Meskhetian Turks and perhaps even more importantly, the 
lack of comprehension of the Meskhetian Turks’ own perceptions, desires and 
intentions concerning their future place of settlement, remain major unanswered 
questions for the implementation of more targeted plans of actions to address the 
Meskhetian Turk issue. 
 
International actors, strongly encouraged by Meskhetian Turkish organizations 
such as Vatan, have long based their interventions on the a priori assumption that 
Meskhetian Turks wish to return to Georgia, and that a solution to the Meskhetian 
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Turk issue should be based on providing the necessary framework for this 
anticipated resettlement. This approach has resulted in some surveys designed to 
quantify the Meskhetian Turks and count the numbers of those who wish to 
resettle, through means of quantitative surveys conducted by use of questionnaires 
and an intention to conduct more surveys of a similar character. The contention 
here is that little can be obtained by ‘counting’ Meskhetian Turks and that 
quantitative surveys are inadequate to grasp the complex nature of identity, 
belonging, territorial anchoring and migration – issues that are inextricably linked 
to the issue of resettlement – and, therefore, that such approaches do not serve to 
provide answers to the question of whether Meskhetian Turks, in fact, wish to 
resettle in larger numbers.  
 
Indeed, Meskhetian Turks face problems in many regions and countries, for the 
moment especially in Southern Russia. However, in still more countries, the 
continuous settlement of Meskhetian Turks does not necessarily pose a problem: 
Many Meskhetian Turk, e.g. in Ukraine or in certain regions of the Central Asian 
republics, are well integrated, and many among the younger generations, notably 
those born and brought up in their new countries of settlement, do not hold a 
desire to resettle in Georgia. In other words, the displacement of Meskhetian 
Turks does not in all cases, six decades after the initial deportation, constitute a 
problem for the people concerned. Here, the international efforts to assist the 
Meskhetian Turks, by focusing on the deportation-resettlement issue, may at 
times appear to be counter-productive and in incongruity with its own intentions. 
Or, in the words of Kathryn Tomlinson:  
 
“[…] scholars who insist on the Meskhetian Turks’ right to 
repatriation […] tell them stories about themselves which may 
raise unrealistic hopes if not actually force them to move.”92 
 
                                                
92 Tomlinson, “Coping as Kin…”, 233. 
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International human rights practices hold that Meskhetian Turks’ preferences 
should provide the guidelines for any policies and solutions in the future. But 
what are their preferences? Do Meskhetian Turks consider southwest Georgia as 
their homeland to which they wish to return; or do they feel more attached to their 
current places of current settlement in the post-Soviet space, or perhaps in 
Turkey? There are contradictory accounts of these questions. While Meskhetian 
Turks seem to emphasize the right to ‘their land’, some argue that this attitude is 
not necessarily fixed to a definite physical place. 
 
In recent studies, some scholars have argued that Meskhetian Turks do not 
actually have sentimental ties to Georgia to the extent that would make them 
inclined to return to their native lands.93 One expert on forced migration and 
Meskhetian Turks, Kakoli Ray, has argued that for Meskhetian Turks, Georgia 
represents merely a place that could guarantee security from a possible third 
forced migration, thus making the territory desirable. In other words, repatriation 
can offer legitimization and protection for Meskhetian Turks within citizenship 
structures and bring an end to the permanent feeling of insecurity and sense of 
being temporary residents or guests.94 Furthermore, against the commonly 
accepted discourse of repatriation as the optimal solution for involuntary 
displaced people, it is argued that a possible repatriation to Georgia, instead of 
securing Meskhetian Turks against a possible third forced replacement, could 
actually instigate it. Repatriation could legitimize the efforts of the Krasnodar 
Krai authorities to expel their Meskhetian Turks from the region.95 
 
Inevitably, this leads to a discussion of the Meskhetian Turks’ concepts of  
‘homeland’ and ‘rootedness’, i.e. what are the Meskhetian Turks’ perceptions of 
belonging to a homeland? Is the ‘homeland’, or the ‘home’ a place where 
Meskhetian Turks live with their extended families and relatives? Is it a place in 
                                                
93 Ibid.; and Kakoli Ray, “Repatriation and De-territorialization: Meskhetian Turks' Conception of 
Home”, Journal of Refugee Studies, Volume 13, Issue 4, (2000), 391-414. 
94 Ray, “Repatriation and De-Territorialization…”. 
95 Tomlinson cf. Ray (2000) in “Coping as Kin…”, 233.  
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southwest Georgia? Or, is it a place where the people can live in accordance with 
their customs, without being pestered or harassed, perhaps unrelated to any 
particular territory? Moreover, what is the role of the post-Soviet space for 
Meskhetian Turks? Have these people adopted the former Soviet Union as “their 
territory”, and thus become nationals of a state that does not exist anymore? Some 
recent studies have concluded that Meskhetian Turks’ expectations and plans for 
the future are more often based on realities concerning the well-being of their 
families rather than sentimental ties and visions of the future, Meskhetian Turks 
thus being pragmatic rather than guided by ideals. Tomlinson notes that 
“Meskhetian Turks examine their options for the future in pragmatic terms, aware 
of their past residence in Georgia but primarily concerned with the safety and 
livelihood of their households and relatives, and only secondarily for the cohesion 
of their community.”96 
 
Following this assertion, it is also tempting to examine the actual role and 
influence of Meskhetian Turks’ organizations among their widely dispersed and 
diversified communities; and study why a lack of group cohesion seems prevalent 
within the Meskhetian Turkish communities; whether the existing organizations 
in fact represent a larger segment of Meskhetian Turks, which some scholars 
question; and determine whether the absence of unifying political structures 
constitutes an undesirable obstacle for promoting durable solutions to the 
Meskhetian Turks’ problems (in a similar vein as the international policy makers 
on national minority issues seem to anticipate the lack of Roms’ socio-political 
organization as a hindrance for promotion of Roma human rights), or whether, in 
fact, the lack of political organization reflects an absence of a unifying ethnic or 
national consciousness. 
 
An interesting point of reference for the efforts to find a solution to the issue of 
repatriation of the Meskhetian Turks is the case of the Crimean Tatars’ 
resettlement to the Crimea (Ukraine) since 1989. The Crimean Tatars, like the 
                                                
96 Ibid. 234. 
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Meskhetian Turks, were deported from their native lands, mainly to Central Asia, 
during World War II. With the assistance of the international community, 
however, an estimated 250,000 Crimean Tatars have repatriated to Ukraine. The 
scope of international involvement and financial support for the Crimean Tatars 
has, beyond any doubt, exceeded the international help for any other groups of 
people with a similar fate. Undoubtedly, the geopolitical, strategic and economic 
importance of Crimea has played a major role drawing more international 
attention to the issue of resettlement.97 Although this is not the case with the 
efforts to promote Meskhetian Turks’ repatriation, the successful identity 
retention and experiences of return of the Crimean Tatars can provide the 
international community with a valuable example to draw lessons in searching for 
a durable solution to the problems of the Meskhetian Turks. 
 
Further research is needed to cast light on these complex questions, and the study 
of the Meskhetian Turks’ discourses of identity, migration processes, ‘homeland’ 
and social organization could help to establish alternatives to the current discourse 
in the efforts of international actors to find sustainable solutions to the current 
problems faced by Meskhetian Turks. 
 
The Georgian Government has so far almost categorically refused to grant 
Meskhetian Turks permission to resettle in their native territory in Samtskhe-
Javakheti, while, in theory, returnees may settle in other parts of Georgia. The 
governing structures are worried that an influx of Meskhetian Turks into 
Samtskhe-Javakheti might trigger interethnic conflict with today’s population of 
Georgians and Armenians. To be sure, the local population in Samtskhe-Javakheti 
is far from favorably disposed towards the Meskhetian Turks, but still, very little 
is known about the in-depth attitudes in the region, as most accounts rely on the 
widely circulated propositions on the high likelihood of tension, or conflict, 
should a wide-scale repatriation take place. Most certainly, any potential tension 
                                                
97 Svetlana Chervonnaya, “Problemy vozvrascheniya I integratsii krimskyh tatar v Krimu: 1990-e 
gody”, Institut Etnologii i Antropologii Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk, (Moscow 1997), 39-40. 
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should be addressed and dealt with accordingly. However extensive reproduction 
of assumptions and “threats” holds the danger of creating the very same 
predicament it claims to avert in the first place. Debate and efforts on the issue 
have generally focused on the need to find a solution for the population group’s 
repatriation to Georgia. Regardless of the Meskhetian Turks’ right to resettlement 
to their place of origin, six decades after the initial deportation one should not 
take the commonly accepted propositions for repatriation as the only possible, or 
even the optimal solution, at least before this unique case is explored in a manner 
that matches its complexity. 
 
